Confusion in the Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Standard of Review Should Courts Employ When Evaluating Interconnection Agreements? by Sharkey, Kimberly L.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 3 Article 5
2001
Confusion in the Wake of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996: What Standard of Review Should




Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kimberly L. Sharkey, Confusion in the Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Standard of Review Should Courts Employ When
Evaluating Interconnection Agreements?, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2001) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol28/iss3/5





CONFUSION IN THE WAKE OF THE  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996:  
WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW SHOULD COURTS EMPLOY WHEN 
EVALUATING INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS? 
 























Recommended citation: Kimberly L. Sharkey, Confusion in the Wake of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Standard of Review Should Courts Employ When 
Evaluating Interconnection Agreements?, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 831 (2001).  
831 
CONFUSION IN THE WAKE OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: 
WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW SHOULD COURTS 
EMPLOY WHEN EVALUATING 
 INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS? 
KIMBERLY L. SHARKEY* 
 I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................  831 
 I. SPECIFICS OF THE ACT: CREATION AND REVIEW OF INTERCONNECTION 
AGREEMENTS ......................................................................................................  834 
 II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES: WHO INTERPRETS THE ACT?.......................................  837 
A. The Role of the FCC .....................................................................................  838 
B. The Continuing Role of State Commissions................................................  839 
1. States’ Interpretation of the Act’s Pricing Provisions...........................  840 
2. States’ Interpretation of the Act’s Reciprocal Compensation 
Provisions ..............................................................................................  841 
3. Summary...............................................................................................  843 
 IV. WHAT LEVEL OF DEFERENCE SHOULD COURTS OWE STATE COMMISSIONS 
WHEN THEY INTERPRET THE ACT? THE IMPORTANCE OF DE NOVO REVIEW OF 
NON-FCC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT..........................................................  844 
 V. THE HIX STANDARD AND THE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
NEGOTIATED AND ARBITRATED AGREEMENTS....................................................  848 
 VI. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................  853 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 19961 (“the Act”) 
to “promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure 
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommuni-
cations consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new tele-
communications technologies.”2 While the Act covers several aspects 
of the telecommunications industry, including broadcast services3 
and cable television,4 one of the most important goals of the Act cen-
ters on the local telephone sector.5 The Act aims to foster local com-
petition by “break[ing] down the local monopol[ies] . . . and . . . en-
courag[ing] competitors to enter the local telephone market.”6 
                                                                                                                  
 * J.D., Florida State University, 2001; B.A., Southeastern Louisiana University, 
1998. I would like to thank Joseph A. McGlothlin for his ideas and guidance but especially 
for his kindness and patience. I would also like to thank my parents, Kristin and Kelly, for 
their endless love and support. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.). Unless otherwise specified, all references in this Note to the “Act” refer only to Ti-
tle I of the Act, the portion of the Act entitled “Telecommunications Services.” 
 2. Id. at preamble, 100 Stat. at 56. 
 3. See generally id. at tit. II, 100 Stat. at 107. 
 4. See generally id. at tit. III, 100 Stat. at 114. 
 5. See generally id. at tit. I, 110 Stat. at 56. 
 6. Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Under the 1996 
Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2210, 2224 (1997). 
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 This goal is a marked departure from traditional ideas surround-
ing the nature of local telephone service, which until the 1990s was 
seen as “a natural monopoly.”7 Historically, local exchange carriers 
(LECs) received exclusive franchises from the state.8 The franchise 
extended to the elements that comprise the physical network.9 How-
ever, with the passage of the Act, Congress ended the tradition of 
“state-sanctioned monopolies” in the local telephone industry.10 Con-
gress perceived that undoing this long tradition held potentially 
great benefits for consumers. It has been estimated that creating 
competition in the local telephone market could save consumers as 
much as $12 billion.11 
 But the task is a daunting one. Before the passage of the Act, the 
local telephone market generated $95 billion in annual revenues and 
was far and away “the largest and most concentrated sector of the 
telecommunications market.”12 As a result of the barriers to local 
competition, seven companies received eighty percent of the indus-
try’s annual revenues.13 Additionally, ten providers that did not com-
pete against one another in any local market controlled ninety-two 
percent of the local telephone industry.14 
 To ease newcomers’ entry into the market and prevent incum-
bents from engaging in anticompetitive behavior, the Act obligates 
incumbents to share their networks with any requesting carrier.15 It 
                                                                                                                  
 7. AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999); see also HENK BRANDS & 
EVAN T. LEO,  THE LAW AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS  16-19 
(Artech House 1999) (explaining that where there is a natural monopoly, competition is 
typically considered ineffective and uneconomical, but that regulation prohibiting market 
entry makes it difficult to determine if the local telecommunications industry is a natural 
monopoly). 
 8. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371. 
 9. See id. These elements generally include “the local loops (wires connecting tele-
phones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the 
transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) that constitute a local exchange 
network.” Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2212 (citing Eleven Attorneys’ General Support 
Competition in Local Multipoint Distribution Market, ANTITRUST REP. (National Ass’n of 
Att’ys Gen., Wash., D.C.), May/June 1996, at 7); see also BRANDS & LEO, supra note 7, at 
10-11 (noting that telecommunications services, including local and long-distance services, 
wireless services, and pay phone services, generate a combined $220 billion annually, with 
half of this coming from local services). Ninety-seven percent of the revenues from local 
services are generated by incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). See id. 
 12. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2211. 
 13. The seven largest ILECs are GTE (serving 20 million access lines); Sprint (7 mil-
lion access lines); and the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs): Ameritech (20 mil-
lion access lines), Bell Atlantic (40 million access lines), BellSouth (22 million access lines), 
SBC (35 million access lines), and U.S. West (15 million access lines). See BRANDS & LEO, 
supra note 7, at 11. 
 14. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2211 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 49-
50 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 13). 
 15. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also AT&T Communications 
Sys. v. Pacific Bell, 203 F.3d 1183, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that Congress imposed 
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requires the parties to negotiate to form interconnection agreements 
detailing their arrangement.16 If the parties cannot reach an agree-
ment, they will be subject to arbitration by their controlling commis-
sion.17 
 The Act states that parties may appeal the arbitration’s outcome 
to federal district courts. 18 But the Act is entirely silent as to the ex-
tent of the courts’ involvement, failing to designate which standard of 
review to apply to determinations of state commissions. 19 Although 
courts owe deference to federal agency interpretations, 20 there is no 
established rule that delineates what level of deference courts should 
give interpretations by state agencies on issues of federal law. Con-
fusing matters further is the fact that jurisdiction over the Act is di-
vided between the federal and state levels. In an attempt to sort out 
the confusion, the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, 
in U.S. West Communications v. Hix,21 created a two-level standard 
of review to be employed in these telecommunications cases, assign-
ing the majority of issues an arbitrary-and-capricious standard.22 
 This Note argues that it is improper to apply a deferential stan-
dard to interpretations of federal law by state commissions arbitrat-
ing interconnection agreements; a de novo standard is more appro-
priate. Deference might be appropriate when the Federal Communi-
                                                                                                                  
the duty for ILECs to share networks after “[r]ecognizing that competitors would have dif-
ficulty replicating local network facilities”). 
 16. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1). 
 17. See id. § 252(b). The telecommunications carriers in each state are governed by a 
state commission, typically referred to as the state’s public service commission or public 
utilities commission. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 7, at 8-9. When this Note discusses 
the commissions or the state agencies charged with implementing certain provisions of the 
Act, it is these entities to which the Note is referring. 
 18. Section 252(e)(6) provides: 
In any case in which a State commission makes a determination [approving or 
rejecting the agreement], any party aggrieved by such determination may bring 
an action in an appropriate Federal district court to dete rmine whether the 
agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and 
this section. 
Id. 
 19. Although the appropriate standard of review is a debated issue, the scope of re-
view is undisputed—even though Congress failed to address it in the Act. See, e.g., U.S. 
West Communs., Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 1998 WL 350588, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 1998) 
(stating that when evaluating interconnection agreements, the scope of review is confined 
to the administrative record); U.S. West Communs., Inc. v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D. 
Colo. 1997) (citing U.S. v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714 (1963)); see also Franklin 
Savings Ass’n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(defining the scope of review as “the evidence the reviewing court will examine in review-
ing an agency decision”).  
 20. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984). 
 21. 986 F. Supp. 13. 
 22. Id. at 19. 
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cations Commission23 (FCC) has promulgated rules on the issue, be-
cause the state commission is likely to merely be implementing the 
FCC’s rules. But when the FCC has not issued rules on ambiguous 
provisions of the Act, state commissions cannot implement them 
without interpreting them. Allowing state agencies to interpret the 
Act would endanger its uniformity. There is need for consistent in-
terpretation of federal acts among the states, especially in the tele-
communications industry, where many of the same parties compete 
in numerous states and debate the same issues in each of these 
states. 
 Part II of this Note outlines important provisions of the Act, ex-
plaining how interconnection agreements are created and reviewed 
by state commissions. Part III describes the relevant jurisdictional 
issues, revealing that while the FCC has broad authority to regulate 
in this area, important issues involving interpretation of the Act re-
main for which there are no helpful FCC rules. These issues have 
been left for state commissions to resolve. Part III offers two exam-
ples, reciprocal compensation and pricing methodology, of areas in 
which states have been actively interpreting the Act. Part IV then 
turns to the appropriate standard of review federal courts ought to 
employ in reviewing the decisions of state commissions, arguing that 
the need for uniformity dictates the use of a de novo standard when-
ever state commissions interpret the Act. Part V describes the case 
law on this issue, explaining how application of the Hix standard has 
resulted in federal courts improperly deferring to state commissions 
on important issues of federal law. This Note suggests that an ap-
propriate standard of review would distinguish negotiated from arbi-
trated agreements. Part VI then concludes that the Hix standard 
should be reformulated to require de novo review of arbitrated 
agreements; if necessary, Congress should step in to explicitly pro-
vide for this by statute. 
II.   SPECIFICS OF THE ACT: CREATION AND REVIEW OF 
INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS 
 The Act has two main components. First, it prohibits states from 
“enforc[ing] laws that impede competition.”24 Second, it subjects in-
cumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) “to a host of duties intended 
to facilitate market entry.”25 Among these duties is an obligation to 
                                                                                                                  
 23. See AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999). The FCC is the federal 
agency with the “rulemaking authority to carry out the ‘provisions of this Act,’ which in-
clude [sections] 251 and 252,” the sections dealing with the local te lephone sector. Id. (re-
fusing to agree with arguments that the FCC’s “rulemaking authority is limited to those 
provisions dealing with purely interstate and foreign matters”). 
 24. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371. 
 25. Id. 
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offer carriers seeking entry to the market “nondiscriminatory access 
to network elements.”26 The Act sets forth a number of important 
standards: 
[ILECs must provide access] on an unbundled basis at any techni-
cally feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this sec-
tion and section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange car-
rier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner 
that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order 
to provide such telecommunications service.27 
 An ILEC may fulfill the access requirement in one of three ways: 
1) It can sell the requesting carrier telephone services at wholesale 
rates that the requesting carrier can resell to consumers; 2) it can 
lease unbundled network elements to the requesting carrier; or 3) it 
can allow the requesting carrier to interconnect the requesting car-
rier’s facilities with its own.28 The details of these arrangements are 
negotiated between the parties at the market entrants’ request. The 
resulting agreements are referred to as “interconnection agree-
ments.”29  
 The Act requires that these agreements include provisions govern-
ing certain aspects of the arrangement between the ILEC and the 
competitor, including resale,30 number portability,31 dialing parity,32 
access to rights-of-way,33 and reciprocal compensation.34 The agree-
ment must also, at a minimum, “include a detailed schedule of item-
ized charges for interconnection and each service or network element 
included in the agreement.”35 
                                                                                                                  
 26. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 27. Id. § 251(c)(3). Section 252 specifies “[p]rocedures for negotiation, arbitration, and 
approval of agreements.” Id. § 252. 
 28. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (citing § 251(c)). 
 29. See § 251(c)(1). 
 30. See § 251(b)(1). LECs have a “duty not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable 
or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of its telecommunications se r-
vices.” Id. 
 31. See § 251(b)(2). LECs have a “duty to provide, to the extent technically feasible, 
number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission.” Id. 
 32. See § 251(b)(3). LECs have a “duty to provide dialing parity to competing provid-
ers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service, and the duty to permit all 
such providers to have nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator services, 
directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing delays.” Id. 
 33. See § 251(b)(4). LECs have an imposing “duty to afford access to the poles, ducts, 
conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications 
services or rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224.” Id.  
 34. See § 251(b)(5). LECs must “establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for 
the transport and termination of telecommunications.” Id. 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1). 
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 Not all agreements are negotiated. Where the parties are unable 
to reach an agreement,36 industry newcomers looking to become 
LECs may force ILECs “to negotiate . . . and to engage in a state-
supervised mediation and arbitration process in order to produce an 
interconnection agreement.”37 If the parties have not reached an 
agreement within 135 days of the initial request for an interconnec-
tion agreement, then either party to the negotiation may petition the 
state commission for arbitration on any unresolved issues. 38 When 
arbitrating issues, the Act requires the commission to ensure that 
the agreement meets the requirements of section 251, follows FCC 
rules promulgated under section 251, and adheres to a pricing stan-
dard set forth in section 252(d).39 The states have nine months from 
the initial request to resolve arbitrated issues. 40  
 The Act also requires the approval of the relevant state commis-
sion; this requirement applies to both arbitrated and negotiated 
agreements.41 “A State commission to which an agreement is submit-
ted shall approve or reject the agreements, with written findings as 
to any deficiencies.”42 When reviewing negotiated interconnection 
agreements, the commission is only to consider whether the agree-
ment “discriminates against a telecommunications carrier not a 
party to the agreement”43 and whether “implementation of such 
agreement . . . is not consistent with the public interest, convenience 
and necessity.”44 After the parties submit their negotiated agree-
ment, the state commission has ninety days to act to approve or re-
ject the agreement; if the commission does not act, the negotiated 
agreement will be deemed approved.45 
 Even when the commission itself serves as an arbitrator, it must 
still approve or reject the agreement upon completion. However, the 
commission’s review here is of wider scope than that of arbitrated 
agreements; it may reject arbitrated agreements for failure to meet 
the requirements of section 251, follow the FCC rules, or adhere to 
section 252(d)’s pricing standards.46 With both negotiated and arbi-
trated agreements, in the absence of action by the state commission, 
the FCC will determine whether to approve the agreement: 
                                                                                                                  
 36. The Act includes a provision requiring ILECs to negotiate in good faith. See § 251 
(c)(1). 
 37. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2226. 
 38. See § 252(b)(1). 
 39. See § 252(c). 
 40. See § 252(b)(4)(C). 
 41. See § 252(e)(1). 
 42. Id. § 252(e)(1). 
 43. Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(i). 
 44. Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
 45. See § 252(e)(4). 
 46. Id. § 252(e)(B). 
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If a State commission fails to act to carry out its responsibility un-
der [section 252,] . . . then the [FCC] shall issue an order preempt-
ing the State commission’s jurisdiction of that proceeding or mat-
ter within 90 days after being notified (or taking notice) of such 
failure, and shall assume responsibility of the State commission 
under this section with respect to the proceeding or matter and act 
for the State commission.47 
 Finally, the Act provides that parties can appeal a commission’s 
final order approving or rejecting an agreement to federal district 
court.48 This is true for both negotiated and arbitrated agreements. 
Unfortunately, the Act does not provide a standard of review. It does 
not distinguish, with respect to judicial review, between negotiated 
and arbitrated agreements. Nor does it distinguish between issues 
governed by FCC rules and those issues that the FCC has not yet 
addressed. 
III.   JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES: WHO INTERPRETS THE ACT? 
 Jurisdictional issues have always been a complicated matter in 
the telecommunications field.49 The Act serves only to compound 
these complications. It relies heavily on state commissions to oversee 
interconnection agreements between the local market’s incumbent 
monopolist and new entrants.50 Nonetheless, it delegates substantial 
authority to the FCC as well. For example, in addition to granting 
the FCC the authority to evaluate agreements when state commis-
sions fail to do so,51 the Act directs the FCC to establish rules regard-
ing a number of other issues, including number portability52 and ac-
cess requirements to network elements. 53 It also authorizes the FCC 
to create “impartial entities to administer telecommunications num-
                                                                                                                  
 47. Id. § 252(e)(5). 
 48. See § 252(e)(6); see also § 252(e)(4) (precluding a state court’s jurisdiction to review 
the action of a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under section 
252). But see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that the parties can take issues involving interpretation of agreements—
matters of contract law —to state court), cert. granted in part sub. nom. Mathias v. World-
Com Techs., Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1224 (Mar. 5, 2001). 
 49. See generally M. Anne Swanson & J.G. Harrington, The Future of Telecommunica-
tions (As We Know It)—Blurred Boundaries and Jurisdictional Conflicts, in 17TH ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 139, 146 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 584, 1999) (explaining 
that in the telecommunications industry, companies are subject to regulatory requirements 
on a routine basis at local, state, federal, and international levels), available at Westlaw, 
584 PLI/Pat 139. 
 50. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications 
Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). 
 51. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5). 
 52. See id. § 251(b)(2). 
 53. See § 251(d)(1). 
838  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:831 
 
bering.”54 Finally, it draws federal courts into the jurisdictional may-
hem by subjecting the state commission’s approval or rejection of an 
interconnection agreement to review by the federal courts. 55 
A.   The Role of the FCC 
 In 1996, the FCC promulgated rules implementing and interpret-
ing various provisions of the Telecommunications Act.56 These rules 
gave rise to a number of challenges, which was not surprising given 
the scope of state commissions’ authority prior to the Act and the 
amount of intrusion the rules appear to make into areas of obviously 
intrastate concern, such as pricing standards. All challenges to the 
rules, initiated by both state commissions and ILECs, were ulti-
mately consolidated into one proceeding in the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.57 In Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit in-
validated a number of the FCC’s rules, including the pricing stan-
dards, holding that the FCC has authority over interstate matters 
only.58 
 The FCC, joined by AT&T and MCI, appealed the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision, and the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in 1999, 
in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.59 The ILECs defended the 
Eighth Circuit’s opinion, arguing that the FCC’s rulemaking author-
ity extends only to interstate and foreign matters—and not to intra-
state concerns. 60 The Eighth Circuit had held that 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) 
would prevent FCC rulemaking in this area without express author-
ity by the 1996 Act, which it found was not included in the Act.61 In-
sisting that express authority was required, the ILECs argued that 
the Act does not provide the FCC the necessary express jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                  
 54. Id. § 251(e)(1). 
 55. See § 252(e)(6). After a determination by a state commission to approve or reject 
an interconnection agreement, whether arbitrated or negotiated, “any party aggrieved by 
such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to dete r-
mine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements” of sections 251 and 52 
of the Act. Id.; see also Weiser, supra note 50, at 13-14. But see BellSouth Telecommuns., 
Inc. v. North Carolina Utils. Comm’n, 240 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that federal 
courts may only review the final decisions by state commissions to approve or reject inte r-
connection agreements; all other issues must be brought in state court). 
 56 See generally First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 4 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1 (Aug. 
8, 1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 51, 90) [hereinafter First Re-
port], 1996 WL 452885, summarized at 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476 (Aug. 29, 1996), 1996 WL 
489810. 
 57. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 792 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting the earlier 
consolidation), rev’d in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
 58. Id. at 819. 
 59. 525 U.S. 366. 
 60. See id. at 374. 
 61. See id. at 375. 
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grant.62 They also pointed out that the Act gives state commissions a 
role in problem solving, and they argued that this limits the FCC’s 
jurisdiction.63 Finally, they argued that the FCC should not be given 
power to review agreements that state commissions have approved.64 
 The Court rejected the jurisdictional arguments; it pointed to sec-
tion 201(b) of the Act, which “gives the FCC jurisdiction to make 
rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act applies.”65 Thus, the 
FCC acted within its jurisdiction in making rules that regulate intra-
state communications. 66 The Court explained that “Congress ex-
pressly directed that the 1996 Act, along with its local-competition 
provisions [sections 251 and 252], be inserted into the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.”67 Further, section 251(i), created by the 1996 Act, 
states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
otherwise affect the [FCC]’s authority under section 201.”68 Conse-
quently, the Court ruled that Congress took regulation of local tele-
communications away from the States, and it was therefore within 
the jurisdiction of the FCC to make rules regarding the regulation of 
intrastate communications. 69 The Court swept away the ILECs’ other 
arguments as well, to specifically hold that “the Commission has ju-
risdiction to design a pricing methodology” under section 252(d), 
notwithstanding the role granted to state commissions in reviewing 
prices: “It is the States that will apply those standards and imple-
ment that methodology . . . . That is enough . . . .”70 
 Thus, the Court embraced an interpretation of the 1996 Act that 
offers the FCC a strong role in regulating in this area. This would 
suggest that Congress intended that important portions of the Act be 
interpreted in a uniform way, on a federal level. It also has implica-
tions for determining the proper role of state commissions. The next 
section addresses this issue. 
B.   The Continuing Role of State Commissions 
 For the time being, the FCC’s jurisdiction is secure. Nonetheless, 
there remain a number of important issues under the Act that are 
not governed by FCC regulation. The pricing standard of section 
252(d) and the reciprocal compensation requirement of section 
                                                                                                                  
 62. The Court deemed this argument “academic” after rejecting the second argument. 
See id. at 383. 
 63. See id. at 383-84. 
 64. The Court found this argument to be unripe, as no such event had yet occurred. 
See id. at 386. 
 65. Id. at 380. 
 66. See id. at 379-80. 
 67. Id. at 377-78 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)). 
 68. 47 U.S.C. § 251(i). 
 69. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 378-79. 
 70. Id. at 384. 
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251(b)(5) are two such examples. Without FCC guidance, state com-
missions arbitrating and/or reviewing interconnection agreements 
are left to interpret these provisions on their own. 
1.   States’ Interpretation of the Act’s Pricing Provisions 
 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Iowa Utilities Board, the 
Eighth Circuit on remand again invalidated several FCC regulations, 
including pricing regulations promulgated under section 252(d), this 
time holding that the regulations were not reasonable interpreta-
tions of the Act. 71 Although courts must defer to interpretations of 
federal law made by federal agencies, they are only required to do so 
if the agency’s “interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of 
the statute or is a reasonable construction of an ambiguous stat-
ute.”72 Applying this rule, the Eighth Circuit held that the FCC’s 
pricing rules conflicted with the clear language of the Act.73 
 Section 252(d)(1) states that pricing standards “may include a 
reasonable profit,”74 but that they must be both nondiscriminatory 75 
and “based on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or net-
work element.”76 The Act does not specify how to calculate the cost. 
The FCC’s pricing rules would calculate cost using “a forward-looking 
economic cost methodology that is based on the Total Element Long-
run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) of the element.”77 This methodology 
ties the costs for access charged to the carrier seeking entry to the 
most efficient technology available in the industry, regardless of 
what technology the ILEC actually possesses. 78 The Eighth Circuit 
found this contradicted the clear meaning of the statute: 
Congress intended the rates to be “based on the cost . . . of provid-
ing the interconnection or network element,” not on the cost some 
imaginary carrier would incur by providing the newest, most effi-
cient, and least cost substitute for the actual item or element 
which will be furnished by the existing ILEC pursuant to Con-
gress’s mandate for sharing. . . . Congress knew it was requiring 
the existing ILECs to share their existing facilities and equipment 
with new competitors . . . and it expressly said that the ILECs’ 
                                                                                                                  
 71. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. 
Ct. 877-79 (Jan. 22, 2001). 
 72. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 748-49 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
source Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
 73. See id. at 749-50. 
 74. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(B). 
 75. See § 252(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
 76. Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 77. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 749 (explaining the FCC’s pricing standards); see also 
47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2000); First Order, supra note 56, at ¶ 685. 
 78. See sources cited supra note 77. 
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costs of providing those facilities and that equipment were to be 
recoverable by just and reasonable rates.79 
 While the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case,80 it is 
impossible to predict when a final ruling will come. In the meantime, 
five years after the Telecommunications Act was enacted,81 the FCC 
still has no comprehensive body of regulations in place. The Eighth 
Circuit’s decision thus only adds to the uncertainty and confusion. 
Further, these invalidations may lead the FCC to delay issuance of 
any new rules. 
 As a consequence, state commissions are not only implementing 
the Act, but also interpreting it by making decisions ordinarily made 
by the FCC. For example, after the Eighth Circuit stayed the FCC’s 
pricing regulations in 1997 (before they ever took effect), the Florida 
Public Service Commission (FPSC) interpreted the pricing provisions 
of the Act for itself.82 The FPSC “addressed the matter independ-
ently, without regard to the FCC regulations.”83 Indeed, the FPSC 
ignored the FCC’s TELRIC pricing methodology, instead adopting its 
own pricing methodology, “Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost” 
(TSLRIC).84 While the FCC’s TELRIC based costs on a hypothetical, 
efficient network that could be incorporated into existing facilities, 
the FPSC’s methodology “uses the current network architecture and 
future replacement technology as the basis for determining long-run 
incremental cost.”85 The difference in interpretation is not insignifi-
cant, and the resulting confusion has predictably spawned litigation, 
described more fully in Part V below. The point here is merely that 
state commissions continue to interpret the provisions on their 
own—which will, as later discussed, pose a problem for courts sub-
jecting their decisions to review. 
2.   States’ Interpretation of the Act’s Reciprocal Compensation 
Provisions 
 In addition to interpreting the Act’s pricing provisions, state 
commissions have been left to interpret section 251 of the Act, which 
(among other things) requires LECs “to establish reciprocal compen-
sation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecom-
munications.”86 When one LEC delivers traffic that originated on an-
                                                                                                                  
 79. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750 (citations omitted). 
 80. Verizon Communs., Inc. v. FCC, 121 S. Ct. 877 (Jan. 22, 2001). 
 81. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996). 
 82. See generally MCI Telecommuns. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommuns., Inc., 112 F. 
Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
 83. Id. at 1292 (explaining the FPSC’s reaction to Iowa Utils. Bd. v. Bell Atlantic 
Corp., 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). 
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other LEC’s (the initiating LEC’s) networks, the delivering LEC 
must be compensated for its costs. 87 Because an initiating LEC is 
able to recoup the cost of transporting the call from the caller, but 
the delivering LEC cannot, the initiating LEC must reimburse the 
LEC that delivers the call—that is, it must provide “reciprocal com-
pensation.”88 
 The FCC has construed the duty of reciprocal compensation to ap-
ply only to local traffic (compensation for long-distance traffic was 
unaffected by the Act).89 This has created a question as to whether 
calls bound for Internet service providers90 (“ISP-bound calls”) should 
be considered “local” for reciprocal compensation purposes. 
 The FCC traditionally has looked to a call’s end point when de-
termining its own jurisdiction (which did not extend to local commu-
nications before the 1996 Act) and “consistently has rejected at-
tempts to divide communications at any intermediate points.”91 How-
ever, calls to an ISP do not end at that ISP’s local server; rather, they 
move on to an Internet website often located in another state.92 As 
such, “a substantial portion of Internet traffic involves accessing in-
terstate or foreign websites.”93 Despite the eventual endpoint of the 
call, the initial ISP-bound portion of the call remains a local call, 
prompting the FCC to declare ISP-bound traffic “jurisdictionally 
mixed.”94 But this moniker does not address the problem that the ini-
tiating LEC incurs costs for which it is not compensated.95 
                                                                                                                  
 87. See Illinois Bell Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining the concept of reciprocal compensation), cert. granted in part sub nom. Mathias 
v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1224 (Mar. 5, 2001). 
 88. Id.; see also Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen 
a customer of LEC A calls a customer of LEC B, LEC A must pay LEC B for completing the 
call, a cost usually paid on a per-minute basis.”). 
 89. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.701 (2000); First Report, supra note 56, at ¶ 7. The D.C. Circuit 
explained: 
LECs that originate or terminate long-distance calls continue to be compen-
sated with “access charges,” as they were before the 1996 Act. Unlike reciprocal 
compensation, these access charges are not paid by the originating LEC. In-
stead, the long-distance carrier itself pays both the LEC that originates the call 
and links the caller to the long distance network, and the LEC that terminates 
the call. 
Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 4. 
 90. An Internet service provider (ISP) is a company that offers its customers the abil-
ity to obtain an Internet connection through the phone lines. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 179 
F.3d at 569. 
 91. Declaratory Ruling, Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 17 
Communications Reg. (P&F) 201, at ¶ 10 (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Ruling], 1999 
WL 98037, summarized at 64 Fed. Reg. 14,203 (proposed Mar. 24, 1999), 1999 WL 155163, 
vacated and remanded, Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1. 
 92. See id. ¶ 18. 
 93. Id. ¶ 18. 
 94. Id. ¶ 19. 
 95. See id. ¶ 29.  
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 In a declaratory order adopted February 25, 1999, the FCC dis-
cussed the debate over reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic 
and concluded that it would form a rule to govern these issues. 96 
First, it determined that ISP-bound traffic was not in fact local; how-
ever, it gave state commissions the authority to interpret the matter 
for themselves until promulgation of a rule.97 In addition to granting 
parties the option of including reciprocal compensation provisions in 
their interconnection agreements, the FCC gave state commissions 
the authority, during arbitration proceedings, to construe agree-
ments as requiring compensation. Moreover, “even when the agree-
ments of interconnecting LECs include no linguistic hook for such a 
requirement, the commissions can find that reciprocal compensation 
is appropriate.”98  
 However, the D.C. Circuit eventually vacated and remanded the 
FCC’s 1999 order. The court held that the FCC failed to adequately 
explain how it reached its decision that a LEC’s terminated, ISP-
bound calls are not local. 99 Thus, state commissions are left to inter-
pret this provision of the federal act as well without guidance from 
the FCC.100 
3.   Summary 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s Iowa Utilities Board opinion, “the 
content of the new regulatory model remains unclear.”101 Reciprocal 
compensation and pricing methodology issues are just two examples 
of the scope left for state commission interpretation of the Act. When 
the Court had the opportunity to address whether courts should ex-
tend deference to state commission interpretations, it did not take it. 
The Court noted that while it is well established that state officers 
can interpret and apply federal law,102 it knew of no similar instances 
in which state administrative agencies could make federal policy.103 
However, instead of discussing the proper standard of review federal 
district courts should apply, the Court simply pointed out the novelty 
of “the attendant legal questions [that will arise from the Act],” in-
                                                                                                                  
 96. See id. ¶ 28. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also 1999 Ruling, 
supra note 91, at ¶ 18. 
 99. See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 1. 
 100. [Editor’s Note: As this Note was going to publication, the FCC on remand promul-
gated a new rule. See Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 66 Fed. Reg. 
26,800-01 (May 15, 2001) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51). The new rule provides that 
ISP-bound traffic is exempt from reciprocal compensation under the 1996 Act. See id. at 
26,801. It also provides a pricing mechanism. See id. at 26,802-03.] 
 101. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2212. 
 102. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 385 n.10 (citing United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 
513 (1883)). 
 103. See id. 
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cluding the important question whether federal courts must defer to 
interpretations of federal law by state commissions. 104 
IV.   WHAT LEVEL OF DEFERENCE SHOULD COURTS OWE STATE 
COMMISSIONS WHEN THEY INTERPRET THE ACT? THE IMPORTANCE OF 
DE NOVO REVIEW OF NON-FCC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT 
 As Duane McLaughlin has pointed out, the legislative history of 
the Act reveals three important policies: 
(1) Congress intended there to be basic national standards to en-
sure that states would not be able to thwart competition, (2) Con-
gress saw the FCC as the natural creator of these national stan-
dards, and (3) Congress intended to preserve a significant role for 
the states in assuring that the implementation would conform to 
local needs and conditions.105 
This raises the question of whether a de novo standard or an arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard of review best promotes the Act’s 
goals. In Iowa Utilities Board, the Supreme Court stated that it is 
“aware of no similar instances in which federal policymaking has 
been turned over to state administrative agencies.”106 This important 
statement appears to point in favor of de novo review. Indeed, a re-
cent district court opinion, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Bell-
South Telecommunications, Inc.,107 provides extensive reasoning for 
applying a de novo standard to issues of interpretation.108 The court 
explained why courts should not give a state agency’s interpretation 
of a federal act the same level of deference that it gives a federal 
agency’s interpretation: 
State commissions have no special expertise in interpreting federal 
statutes and no authority to make federal law. Federal courts are 
or should be at least as adept as state commissions in interpreting 
federal statutes. There is thus far less reason for deference to state 
commissions on issues of the meaning and import of the Act, and it 
makes sense for district courts to address such issues de novo, as 
Congress apparently intended.109 
                                                                                                                  
 104. Id. 
 105. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2236. 
 106. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 385. 
 107. 112 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
 108. Id. at 1290-91. 
 109. Id. at 1291 (comparing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), with Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep’t of Social Servs., 
879 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989)). The court explained that it would “review de novo issues 
regarding the meaning and import of the Telecommunications Act and will review the Flor-
ida Commission’s determinations of how to implement the Act as so construed only under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard.” Id. 
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Moreover, the court read section 252(e)(6) of the Act, which desig-
nates federal district courts as the proper authority to review deci-
sions made by state commissions, as requiring de novo review of 
state commissions’ interpretations of the Act, but requiring deference 
in all other instances. 110 
 However, some have argued that de novo review exposes federal 
courts to a number of risks. Professor Weiser has summarized the 
three greatest risks: 
(1) causing bad results through their involvement in policy deci-
sions for which they are ill-suited; (2) damaging their perceived le-
gitimacy if they are seen as making pure policy decisions; and (3) 
acting undemocratically by depriving accountable policymakers of 
the opportunity to make such decisions.111 
Further, he suggests that employing an arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard will increase interstate competition.112 By deferring to state 
agencies, courts can increase “individual tailoring by and competition 
between different states in implementing a federal statute,”113 as 
each state will attempt to tailor the Act to best fit its local condi-
tions. 114 Secondary benefits include the promotion of state autonomy, 
local participation, and greater accountability.115 Furthermore, the 
implementation of the Act would “rely on the economy of local agen-
cies (rather than creating or expanding a new national bureauc-
racy).”116 It is also true that a more deferential standard would pro-
mote at least one important goal of the Act by giving the states a sig-
nificant role in implementing standards that conform to local needs 
and conditions. However, of all the arguments touting the benefits of 
a deferential standard, the most important include increased compe-
tition and state experimentation.117 
 Yet, while it seems logical that innovations in problem solving will 
result when fifty different state governments interpret and imple-
ment an act, innovation has not in fact been a byproduct of “coopera-
tive federalism” under the Telecommunications Act. The debate over 
reciprocal compensation118 provides an example: In industries like 
                                                                                                                  
 110. See id. at 1291. 
 111. Weiser, supra note 50, at 28. 
 112. See id. at 3. 
 113. Id. at 23. 
 114. See id. at 36 (explaining that giving states such an active role in implementing the 
Act “allow[ed] Congress to pursue a policy of diversity and experimentation within a fed-
eral scheme”). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id.; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397 (1997) 
(stating that the benefits of using states as laboratories is one of the primary reasons for 
advocating a decentralized government). 
 118. See generally, e.g., U.S. West Communs. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 
1117 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing as one issue to be reviewed under a de novo standard a 
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telecommunications, states have been reluctant to experiment. As of 
January 2000, seventeen state public utilities commissions had ad-
dressed whether reciprocal compensation should apply to calls to ISP 
traffic.119 As described above, in its now vacated 1999 ruling, the FCC 
had explained that the states were free (until the issuance of an FCC 
rule) to adopt another method of compensation.120 The FCC explicitly 
assured states that the FCC has the ultimate authority, as ISP-
traffic is substantially interstate, but that some form of compensa-
tion is certainly appropriate.121 Yet only New Jersey decided that re-
ciprocal compensation does not apply to ISP-bound traffic.122 The fact 
that no state took the initiative to develop innovations in the meth-
ods of compensation typically used shows that cooperative federalism 
does not necessarily breed experimentation. As Susan Rose-
Ackerman has explained, the decentralized government that results 
from cooperative federalism “can create additional disincentives for 
innovative activity because of spillovers and the lack of sorting by 
risk preferences.”123  
 Furthermore, any benefits that might flow from innovation and 
experimentation are far outweighed by the danger created when al-
lowing each state to interpret the federal Act on its own.124 It is im-
                                                                                                                  
commission’s determination that reciprocal compensation was due for ISP-bound traffic), 
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (June 29, 2000). 
 119. See Pacific Bell, Application 98-11-024 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n June 24, 1999) 
(arbitration proceeding); Global NAPs South, Docket No. 98-540 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
Mar. 9, 1999) (same); Pac-West Telecomm., Inc., Docket No. 98-10015 (Nev. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Mar. 4, 1999) (same); Global NAPs, Inc., Docket No. TO98070426 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. 
Util. July 12, 1999); Electric Lightwave, Inc., Order No. 99-218, ARB 91 (Or. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Mar. 17, 1999) (same); Nextlink Tenn., L.L.C., Docket No. 98-00123 (Tenn. Reg. 
Auth., May 18, 1999) (same); WorldCom v. GTE Northwest, Docket No. UT-980338 (Wash. 
Util. & Trans. Comm’n May 12, 1999) (same); ICG Telecom Group, Docket 26619 (Ala. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n March 4, 1999) (interpretation of a preexisting agreement); Intermedia 
Comm., Inc., v. GTE Florida, Inc., Docket No. 980986-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 30, 
1999) (same); Time Warner Communs, v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Cause No. 41097 (Ind. Util. 
Reg. Comm’n June 9, 1999) (same); MFS Intelenet v. Bell Atlantic, Case No. 8731 (Md. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 11, 1999) (same); U.S. West Communs., Inc., Docket No. P-421/M-
99-529 (Mn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 17, 1999) (same); ICG TelecomGroup, Inc. v. Ameri-
tech Ohio, Case No. 97-1557-TP-CSS (Oh. Pub. Util. Comm’n May 5, 1999) (same); NEVD 
of Rhode Island, L.L.C., Docket No. 2935 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 21, 1999) (same); 
GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., Docket No. 99-0067 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n May 6, 1999) (de-
claratory statement); Opinion Concerning Reciprocal Compensation, Case No. 99-C-0529 
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 26, 1999) (same); Adoption of Partial Settlement, No. P-
00991648 (Penn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 26, 1999) (same). 
 120. See 1999 Ruling, supra note 91, at ¶ 27. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See Global NAPs, Inc., Docket No. TO98070426 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. July 12, 
1999). 
 123. Susan Rose -Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEG. STUDIES 593 (1980). 
 124. But see Weiser, supra note 50, at 3-4 (“[C]omplete uniformity in the implementa-
tion of cooperative federalism statutes is both an undesirable and unattainable goal, as the 
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portant that federal courts not defer to state agencies. By not defer-
ring, Federal courts promote uniformity in the interpretation of the 
law, offer regulated parties certainty and predictability, and keep the 
cost of legal battles low. Even if certain involved parties “would bene-
fit marginally by having a myriad of local statutes,”125 the benefits do 
not necessarily outweigh the associated transaction costs. 
 If courts were to defer to state agencies, it would eliminate uni-
form interpretation and application of federal law.126 Though courts 
have generally deferred to federal agencies, they have done so on the 
basis that federal agencies can contribute to the uniformity of federal 
law, whereas state agencies cannot.127 In fact, the Supreme Court 
stated in Iowa Utilities Board that there is a presumption that “a 
federal program administered by 50 independent state agencies is 
surpassing strange.”128 It would be even stranger in the telecommu-
nications industry, in which the same parties frequently debate the 
same issues in multiple states. 
 Generally, market participants prefer regulations that “emanate 
from the center,”129 because increased uniformity promotes lower 
costs. As has been pointed out with regard to legislation, even where 
federal regulation may be “stricter than what the states might have 
adopted, the transaction costs of fighting fifty . . . battles, only to 
comply with fifty different . . . schemes, [make] it attractive to submit 
to national control.”130 These types of considerations are equally true 
of the need for uniform interpretation of the laws. It would do the 
parties little good to have one, uniform body of federal law inter-
preted fifty different ways. This applies especially to the telecommu-
nications industry, where the same LECs often compete in many dif-
ferent states. 131 
                                                                                                                  
costs of intrusive judicial review are considerable, and there are important benefits that 
come from experimentation and interstate competition.”). 
 125. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic The-
ory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 
271 (1990) (explaining that interest groups would often prefer the passage of a federal law 
over the passage of separate state statutes, due to the high costs “associated with obtaining 
passage of all those statutes”). 
 126. See, e.g., Amisub, Inc. v. Colorado Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
 127. See Weiser, supra note 50, at 20-21. 
 128. AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Board, 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1996). 
 129. Friedman, supra note 117, at 374. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Teligent, About Us, at http://www.teligent.com/docs/aboutus.html (last 
visited May 20, 2001) (stating that Teligent’s does business in over 40 local markets); see 
also KMC Telecom, The 1, at http://www.kmctelecom.com/cities/index.cfm?fuseaction=map 
(last visited May 20, 2001) (40 cities); e.spire Communications, Press Releases, at 
http://www.espire.com/press/index.cfm (last visited May 20, 2001) (38 cities); 
ITC^DeltaCom, Fiber Network, at http://www.itcdeltacom.com/network.html (last visited 
May 20, 2001) (10 states); ICG Communications, Profile: Office Locations, at 
http://www.icgcomm.com/profile/locations.asp (last visited May 20, 2001) (9 states); Global 
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 The need for certainty in the law is particularly important when 
the law is designed to facilitate market entry by new participants. 
This idea has been recognized by the FCC. In its Third Report and 
Order on implementing the Act,132 the FCC delineated factors to be 
considered in evaluating what network elements ILECs are obligated 
to share with market entrants. One of these factors was “certainty in 
the market,”133 or specifically “how the unbundling obligations [the 
FCC] adopt[s] can provide the uniformity and predictability that new 
entrants and fledging competitors need to develop national and re-
gional business plans.”134 Thus, courts ought to resist applying a def-
erential standard to interpret state commissions’ interpretations of 
the act and turn instead to de novo review. 
V.   THE HIX STANDARD AND THE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
NEGOTIATED AND ARBITRATED AGREEMENTS 
 Case law reveals that while the federal courts theoretically apply 
de novo review to state commissions’ interpretations of the Act, in 
many instances they are in fact using a more deferential standard. 
The question of the suitable level of deference to commissions’ deci-
sions was first addressed in a 1997 federal district court opinion, 
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Hix.135 In the absence of Supreme 
Court guidance, the Hix test continues to be applied by other District 
Courts and even Circuit Courts. 136 The Hix court decided “the appro-
priate standard of review to be applied to [state commissions’] deci-
sion[s] approving certain interconnection agreements.”137 The court 
detailed a two-part inquiry to guide a court’s review of state commis-
sions’ decisions. 138 
                                                                                                                  
NAPs, Sites, at http://www.gnaps.com/sites.html (last visited May 20, 2001) (six states plus 
Washington, D.C.); Focal Communications Corporation, Overview, at http://www.focal.com/ 
about (last visited May 20, 2001) (21 cities; 15 states plus Washington, D.C.). 
 132. Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 
F.C.C. Record 3696 (Nov. 5, 1999), 1999 WL 1008985, order modified, Supplemental Order, 
18 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1041 (Nov. 24, 1999), 1999 WL 1065185, and order clari-
fied Supplemental Order Clarification, 15 F.C.C. Record 9587 (June 2, 2000), 2000 WL 
713746.  
 133. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 986 F. Supp 13 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 136. See U.S. West Communs. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 
1999); MCI Telecommuns. Co. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (E.D. 
Mich. 1999); U.S. West Communs., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286 
(D. Utah 1999); AT&T Communs. of the Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 86 
F. Supp. 2d 932 (W.D. Mo. 1999); MCI Telecommuns. Co. v. BellSouth Telecommuns., Inc., 
7 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (“The court’s standard of review in considering 
these matters was set forth in [Hix].”). 
 137. Hix, 986 F. Supp. at 14. 
 138. See id. at 18. 
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 Under the Hix test, the court must first determine whether the 
commission’s decision “procedurally and substantively” adheres to 
the Act. 139 Because this is a question of law, the Hix court stated that 
it is subject to de novo review in federal court.140 If the reviewing 
court finds that the commission acted in compliance with the Act, it 
is then to review all remaining issues under an arbitrary-and-
capricious standard.141 The Hix court elaborated that the rule it de-
veloped does not rely on technical distinctions between “questions of 
law” and “questions of fact.”142 Instead, the court insisted that the 
critical question is whether the issue involves procedural or substan-
tive compliance with the Act. 143 Essentially, under the procedural-
and-substantive-compliance classification delineated in Hix, the only 
issue courts are to review de novo is whether commissions’ decisions 
comply with the Act. 144 For instance, the Act outlines some factors 
the commission should consider before approving or rejecting the in-
terconnection agreement.145  
 But Hix’s classification is problematic. While courts act appropri-
ately when they apply the Hix standard to negotiated agreements, 
applying the Hix standard to arbitrated agreements is completely 
improper. The difference in the appropriate levels of deference hinges 
on the different factors state commissions use when approving nego-
tiated and arbitrated agreements. 146 Few courts have acknowledged 
the distinction between arbitrated and negotiated agreements; 147 
nonetheless, they generally acknowledge that the level of appropriate 
                                                                                                                  
 139. Id. at 18-19. 
 140. See id. at 18 (quoting Colorado Health Care Ass’n v. Colorado Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
842 F.2d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 141. See id. (explaining that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is “highly deferen-
tial; the agency’s action is presumed valid if a reasonable basis exists for its decision,” and 
citing Amisub, Inc. v. Colorado Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 879 F.2d 789, 800 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 142. Id. at 19 (ordering the parties to “avoid use of those labels in arguing how the 
standard of review applies to the specific issues”). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(e)(2)(A)(i-ii). 
 146. Despite the fact that decisions by arbitrators are generally afforded a high level of 
deference, “the appropriate standard derives from that ordinarily applicable to judicial re-
view of administrative decisions, not arbitration decisions.” MCI Telecommuns. Corp. v. 
BellSouth Telecommuns., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291 n.7 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
 147. But see Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 2001 
WL 123663 (4th Cir. 2001). The court explained: 
While [the Act] authorizes review of § 252 arbitration determinations ulti-
mately leading to the formation of interconnection agreements, in the final 
analysis, the State commission determinations under § 252 involve only ap-
proval or rejection of such agreements. With respect to negotiated agreements 
in particular, the federal review is narrower. The only “determination” that can 
be made by the State commission under § 252 on a negotiated agreement is a 
determination to approve or reject it . . . . 
Id. at **21 (footnote omitted). 
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deference depends on whether the issue is one of interpretation or 
implementation.  
 For example, the court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Bell-
South Telecommunications148 explained that “district court review of 
the meaning and import of the Telecommunications Act should be de 
novo and that, when acting in conformance with a correct interpreta-
tion of the Act, state commissions have broad discretion reviewable 
only under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.”149 While the Hix 
standard intends to promote this idea, it fails to do so by overlooking 
the important distinction between negotiated and arbitrated agree-
ments. When a commission has arbitrated an agreement under “a 
correct interpretation of the Act,”150 its approval or rejection of the 
agreement should be given deferential treatment. However, even un-
der this standard, the court must first evaluate whether the commis-
sion in fact correctly interpreted the Act. This is even more true 
when the court is reviewing an arbitrated agreement. 
 Courts are skipping this inquiry entirely. Instead, they begin with 
a deferential view of the commissions’ actions and, apparently, a pre-
sumption that the commissions are correctly interpreting the Act. 
MCI Communications and a later case before the same court illus-
trate. In MCI Communications, MCI challenged the Florida Commis-
sion’s (FPSC’s) pricing methodology (TSLRIC) described in Part III 
above, arguing that it should mirror the FCC’s methodology 
(TELRIC).151 The FPSC had imposed this methodology during an ar-
bitration of an interconnection agreement between MCI and Bell-
South.152 The U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Florida 
noted that the Act does not address whether TSLRIC or TELRIC 
provides the proper pricing methodology and that valid arguments 
existed for either methodology:  
Nothing in the Telecommunications Act specifies which of these 
two methodologies must be followed. . . . This is, therefore, an issue 
on which the appropriate administrative agency’s adoption of ei-
ther methodology would survive judicial review under the applica-
ble arbitrary and capricious standard. 
 . . . Had [the Eighth Circuit’s initial invalidation of the FCC 
rules] remained intact [following appeal to the Supreme Court], 
                                                                                                                  
 148. 112 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
 149. Id. at 1290 (basing this standard on “the statutory language, the standards gen-
erally applicable to judicial review of administrative action, the apparent purpose of in-
volving state commissions in this process while providing for federal district court review 
of their decisions, and the emerging case law under the Act”). The court noted, “This ac-
cords with the consistent approach of courts that have addressed this issue under the Act.” 
Id. at 1291-92 (citing, among others, Hix). 
 150. Id. at 1290. 
 151. See id. at 1286. 
 152. See id. at 1289. 
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the Florida Commission’s adoption of TSLRIC would have been 
unassailable.153 
However, the court invalidated FPSC’s adoption of TSLRIC because 
it conflicted with the FCC’s rules. 154 
 Shortly after the MCI decision, the Eighth Circuit again invali-
dated the FCC rules that relied on TELRIC.155 Thus, less than four 
months after MCI, Florida’s pricing provisions were again before the 
court; in AT&T Communications of the Southern States, Inc. v. Bell-
South Telecommunications, the same federal district court in Florida 
readdressed the validity of TSLRIC—and this time upheld it. 156 With 
all conflicting FCC rules invalidated by the Eighth Circuit, the court 
deferred to the FPSC’s decision.157 
 The AT&T court stressed, as it had noted in MCI, that there was 
nothing unreasonable about the FPSC’s methodology.158 Given the 
Eighth Circuit’s finding that the FCC’s methodology violated the 
plain meaning of the Act, this is not too surprising. What is striking 
is not that AT&T upheld the FPSC’s methodology, but how.  
 The court explicitly referred to the methodology as “an . . . inter-
pretation of the Act.”159 One might have expected this to lead to de 
novo review. In fact, the court had formulated its standard of review 
this way: “I will review de novo issues regarding the meaning and 
import of the Telecommunications Act, and I will review state com-
mission determinations of how to implement the Act as so construed 
only under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”160 Yet in uphold-
ing the TSLRIC approach, the court characterized it as “an accept-
able administrative interpretation of the Act that would survive re-
view under the arbitrary and capricious standard. . . . [The] method-
ology does not violate the Act and is not arbitrary and capricious.”161  
 MCI and AT&T reflect the confusion that has been generated by 
application of the Hix test to arbitrated agreements. The Hix stan-
dard, in theory, provides courts with an opportunity to evaluate the 
commissions’ interpretation of the Act by applying a de novo stan-
                                                                                                                  
 153. Id. at 1292. 
 154. See id. at 1290. 
 155. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. 
Ct. 877-79 (Jan. 22, 2001). “Technically, [the Eighth Circuit’s ruling to invalidate the FCC 
regulations] leaves the situation as if the FCC had adopted no regulations at all.” AT&T 
Communs. of the Southern States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommuns., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 
1311 n.5 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (declining to address whether the Eighth Circuit’s decision would 
be binding in this situation). 
 156. AT&T Communs., 122 F. Supp. at 1310. 
 157. See id. at 1311 (“But for the FCC’s regulations, I would have upheld the Florida 
Commission’s decision from the outset.”). 
 158. See id. at 1311. 
 159. Id. (emphasis added). 
 160. Id. at 1309. 
 161. Id. at 1311. 
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dard to issues of procedural and substantive compliance. However, in 
practice this is not happening because courts, including the Hix 
court, have not been separating these two elements. Once the court 
decides that a state commission followed the Act’s procedural re-
quirements to approve or reject the agreement in light of specified 
factors, the court does not question whether the commission’s consid-
eration of the factors substantively complied with the Act. Instead, 
courts defer by using an arbitrary-and-capricious standard when as-
sessing how the commission considered the factors. However, there 
are significant distinctions between the two. 
 When reviewing a negotiated agreement, as described above, the 
state commission can only consider whether the agreement “dis-
criminates against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the 
agreement”162 and whether “implementation of such agreement . . . is 
not consistent with the public interest, convenience and necessity.”163 
Under Hix, the court reviews de novo whether the commission proce-
durally and substantively complied with the above regulation. So 
long as the commission considered possible discrimination against 
other carriers and the public’s interest, the court must affirm the 
commission’s decision. Any additional questions, including the com-
mission’s decision regarding those factors, are reviewed under the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The factors used by state commis-
sions to evaluate negotiated agreements do not require them to in-
terpret the Act. As a result, when courts defer to the commissions, 
they are deferring on questions of implementation only. Thus, the ar-
bitrary-and-capricious standard makes sense. 
 However, in arbitration cases, state commissions actually inter-
pret the Act. In reviewing arbitrated agreements, the Act requires 
state commissions to assess whether they meet the requirements of 
section 251 (the section outlining the LECs’ duties), the FCC rules 
promulgating the Act—and the pricing standard of section 252(d).164 
It was this latter standard that was at issue in the AT&T and MCI 
cases. Under the Hix standard, courts should initially decide, under a 
de novo standard, whether the commission considered these factors. 
But according to Hix, courts must then use the “highly deferential” 165 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard to review how the commissions 
considered these factors. What this standard overlooks is that the 
commission must also first determine what the factors are; where the 
statutory standards are unclear, the commission, using its own 
judgment, must give them content before it can consider them. Thus, 
when a court defers to a state commission’s assessment of whether 
                                                                                                                  
 162. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2)(A)(i). 
 163. Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
 164. See id. § 252(e)(B). 
 165. Hix, 986 F. Supp. at 18. 
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an arbitrated agreement complies with the Act, in all practicality the 
court is deferring to the state commission’s own interpretation of the 
Act. 
 As noted above, the courts’ own articulation of the standard of re-
view suggests that state agencies are not supposed to be left to their 
own devices in formulating interpretations of federal law. Yet the 
case law suggests that the courts, perhaps understandably reluctant 
to venture into areas outside their expertise, have been doing just 
that. State commission review of arbitrated agreements inherently 
requires interpretations of the Act; when the FCC has provided none 
(or it has, but the courts have repudiated them) and the courts have 
provided none, then the commissions cannot avoid providing them 
themselves. According deference to these kinds of commission deter-
minations, however, can never create the kind of uniformity that is 
needed in area like this one. The Hix standard ought to be revised to 
account for this fact by requiring courts to review commission deci-
sions involving arbitrated agreements under more rigorous stan-
dards. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 As Justice Scalia explained, “there is no doubt . . . that if the fed-
eral courts believe a state commission is not regulating in accordance 
with federal policy they may bring it to heel.”166 However, for courts 
to ever determine this, they must reformulate the Hix test and con-
sider arbitrated interconnection agreements under a de novo stan-
dard. As evidenced by the reciprocal compensation and pricing meth-
odology situations, state commissions inevitably interpret the Act in 
the absence of FCC regulations.  
 To require federal courts to defer to state interpretations sacri-
fices uniformity, and a uniform interpretation of the Telecommunica-
tions Act is essential to promote competition in the local telephone 
sector. The only way that this can occur is if courts review appeals of 
arbitrated interconnection agreements under a de novo standard of 
review. Deference to state commissions’ decisions results in inconsis-
tent interpretation of the Act. 
 Courts’ applications of Hix’s standard of review guidelines are 
dangerous, because they fail to distinguish between arbitrated 
agreements and negotiated agreements. When arbitrating disputed 
issues, the commissions, for all practical purposes, are interpreting 
the Act. These interpretations take effect because courts continue to 
claim that they are imposing de novo review on matters regarding 
“the meaning” of the Act, when truly they are deferring to state 
agencies on important questions of interpretation. 
                                                                                                                  
 166. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379 n.6 (1999). 
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 If courts continue to apply Hix in this manner, Congress will need 
to revisit the Act and specify that a de novo standard must be used in 
appeals of arbitrated agreements. Federal courts should not be per-
mitted to defer to state commissions’ interpretation of a federal act. 
Otherwise, the ultimate goal of competition for the consumers’ bene-
fit will be at best delayed, at worst sacrificed. 
 
